The Subject of Freedom - Saba Mahmood
In The Subject of Freedom
Saba Mahmood analyses the relationship of feminism and (islamic)
religion and herein examines concepts and issues such as freedom,
(moral) agency,
piety, subjectivation,
subjugation and power.
I believe the The
Subject of Freedom is
an important contribution to our understanding of these concepts and
the way their definitions are argued to be historically and
culturally specific by Mahmood.
In
The Subject of
Freedom Mahmood
offers a critique to liberal assumptions about human nature against
which Islamic movements are often held accountable - such as the
belief that all human beings have an innate desire for freedom, that
we all seek to assert our autonomy when allowed to do so, and that
agency consists of acts that challenge social norms and not that
uphold them.1
In ''the West'', the notion of agency is explained as political and
moral autonomy of the subject: the ability to realise one's own
interests against
the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental will, or other
obstacles.2
It is in this way I believe, that Muslim women are often 'diagnosed'
by feminists as unfree and without agency. What is problematic about
this feminist project is that it locates the desire for submission in
an ahistorical
essence. And this is what is key to understanding Mahmood's
arguments on all the above-mentioned concepts: Agency, freedom,
subjectivity are not ahistorical and universally defined concepts,
but it is under certain historical, cultural and practical conditions that these concepts, modes of being, desires
and subjects are created.
This
critique of the liberalist framework in which notions such as freedom
and agency are defined as immanent and universal, is based on
Foucault's analysis of agency and power. Foucault encourages us to
think of agency a) in terms of the capacities and skills required to
undertake particular kinds of moral actions and b) as ineluctably
bound up with the historically and culturally specific disciplines
through which a subject is formed. So in viewing Muslim movements in
which female supporters for example take on the veil, it is necessary
not to criticize this act by means of our own definition of agency
but to see that this can also be a form of agency, a form of
self-realisation in their particular historic and cultural
environment. This critique of western feminism is in my eyes closely
related to the issue of white saviour which we have discussed last
week. When we want to 'save' Muslim women, or 'liberate' them from
their supposed bondage of the Islamic patriarchy, Mahmood as well as
Lila Abu-Lughod encourage us to think about what we want to save
these women from3
- it might actually be their own particular agency and freedom - and
what we are saving them into.
A
recent form of resistance (to Western feminism) that I believe addresses
this issue of the veil as being a sign of agency - namely the
submission to certain forms of external authority as being a
condition for achieving the subjects potentiality - in stead of oppression is the hashtag #coveredgirl to 'expose' the freedom of
muslim women wearing the veil. Some women have also added the caption ''Do
we look oppressed?!''4 on social media to emphasize that it is western feminists/liberalists who are saying they are oppressed, not they themselves.
1Mahmood,
Saba. p. 5
2Mahmood,
Saba. p. 8
3Abu-Lughod,
Lila.
4Muhammed,
Jerron.
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/jehron_muhammad/Jehron-Muhammad-Muslim-Women-Say-Wearing-Modest-Attire-Brings-Respect.html
No comments:
Post a Comment